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Introduction
I should like, first of all, to commend both
EPA and NIEHS for having organized this
conference which I regard as being truly in
the public interest. This occasion has afforded
many of us an unusual opportunity to ex-
change information and to interact on scien-
tific and technological issues critical to the
formulation of rational policies prior to the
decision-making process, rather than follow-
ing it as is customarily the case.
I do, however, regret that a conflict be-
tween this conference and the rescheduled
meeting of the President's Air Quality Ad-
visory Board, prevented some key EPA
decision-makers from being in attendance.
I also regret that the EPA Office of Public
Affairs decided not to issue a press release
for this meeting. I suspect that the Office of
Public Affairs considers that an open expres-
sion of differences in viewpoints and attitudes
within the agency, such as those which per-
haps it anticipated would emerge at this
meeting, is a sign of weakness. I feel, on
the contrary, that such differences, which
fortunately exist within the various echelons
of EPA, are an expression of strength and
are clearly preferable to the more traditional
monolithic image projected by most federal
agencies.
Further, I particularly regret the refusal
of GM and Ford to make presentations or
even participate in discussions at this meet-
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ing. I would like to offer my sympathy to
GM and Ford representatives for the em-
barassment they appear to have been sub-
jected to by their management, in that they
have been sent here under conditions of
considerable personal constraint. Clearly, this
"short-leash" treatment makes it difficult
for such indentured professionals to dis-
charge societal obligations broader than
narrowly circumscribed corporate interests.
One problem in my giving this overview
of the "public interest" position is that per-
haps I am not formally qualified to do so,
as I am not a "professional" public interest
representative. However, in view of the fact
that, as well known, I have close working
relationships with a wide range of public
interest groups, it was considered appro-
priate for me to attempt to capsulate my
understanding of their viewpoints. These
viewpoints are not easy to define, although
common parlance tends to equate them with
the philosophies and practices of professional
public interest groups in Washington and
elsewhere. These groups are loose ad hoc
organizations which have, in part, generally
arisen as an expression of citizen and con-
sumer concerns and, in part, from the initia-
tives of a small number of young activist
lawyers and other professionals. The pro-
fessional and other staff in these organiza-
tions generally work with remarkable energy
and dedication and with considerable finan-
cial and personal sacrifice for their concept
of the public good and interest. However,
these concepts are clearly not exclusive to
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growing but still small, number of profes-
sionals and citizens not formally associated
with public interest activities.
Restrictions on Access to Data
The restricted availability of information
necessary to the decision-making process is
obviously a critical issue in which the public
interest movement takes a properly uncom-
promising approach. There is a growing con-
sensus that the data currently submitted by
the automobile and related industries to EPA
arehighly selected andgeared to narrowly de-
fined short-term corporate interests. The flow
of much critical information operates on a
closed-loop basis within any industry and
between closely interrelated industries. The
relationship between the catalyst manufac-
turers and the automobile industry, particu-
larly as exemplified at this conference, is
illustrative. The catalyst manufacturers have
stated that they have provided the automobile
industry and the NAS-NRC with all the criti-
cal information on catalyst performance and
on non-regulated emissions. The automobile
industries refer questions on such topics back
to the catalyst manufacturer. The NAS-NRC
refuses to divulge such data as they are con-
fidential. The NAS-NRC continues to claim
exemption from the requirements of the
Freedom of Information Act, although this
is now being challenged in the courts.
The current role of the NAC-NRC in im-
posing restrictions on access to allegedly
confidential data, and the implication of such
practices on the regulatory process, invites
critical consideration. The public interest
sector tends to view this as an eggregious
example of suppression of information and
of the subversion of democratic norms. The
NAC-NRC excludes public or agency access
to working documents and reports of its
panels on the basis of blanket claims of
confidentiality. Illustratively, in the recent
request for information of the NAC-NRC
Committee on Motor Vehicle Emissions,
three of the five pages of the request detailed
how such information would be handled in
confidence. Claims by the NAS-NRC that
they would not otherwise obtain such data
from industry appear unsupportable. Claims
for confidentiality of data should be validated
by the EPA Office of General Counsel to
determine that the data are in fact secret
within terms of the Freedom of Information
Act.
Questions have been raised as to whether
further legislation is needed to enable EPA
to obtain all the information it requires from
industry. I believe that this is not the case.
Perhaps more relevant questions are whether
EPA has demanded the necessary data suf-
ficiently vigorously; whether EPA has initi-
ated active dockets on nonregulated emis-
sions; whether EPA has asked for ongoing
submissions of data on regulated emissions;
whether EPA routinely validates all indus-
trial claims for confidentiality of information
by the Office of General Counsel; and finally,
why EPA does not prepare periodic sum-
maries of such data and make them available
to agency officials, Congress and the public
sector.
A particular concern of public interest
groups and technological echelons in EPA
has been the repeated refusal of industry
over the past two years to supply emissions
data and data on emission control systems on
certification fleets for 1975 cars. The indus-
try position, which has been reiterated at
congressional hearings, is that they are un-
willing to divulge such information until the
1975 cars are placed on sale!
When public representatives cannot obtain
access to basic data relevant to the decision
making process, the result is a covert form
of authoritarian rule. Superficially the ap-
pearance of-democratic process is preserved,
but in reality major policy choices are par-
tially or completely dictated by the major
vested interests which control the data.
The Public Image of the Automobile Industry
The original and once widely admired
qualities of the automobile industry typified
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isni at its best. These qualities have long
since degenerated and have been replaced
by the stance of a narrowly self-serving
oligopolistic industry, whose practices are
often characterized by conspiracy, violation
of antitrust law, manipulation and suppres-
sion of data and a "public be damned" atti-
tude. The basis for such contentions appears
well supported by the following recent epi-
sodes, which collectively hardly inspire public
confidence in the good faith and corporate
mores of the automobile industry.
Illustrative Examples of Conspiracy and
Illegal Acts
In 1969, an antitrust suit was filed by the
Justice Department against domestic auto-
mobile manufacturers and their trade asso-
ciation, the Automobile Manufacturers As-
sociation, for conspiring to restrain the
development and marketing of auto exhaust
control systems since 1953. Evidence was
obtained that the "auto competitors" had
formed an illegal cross-licensing agreement.
The grand jury attempted to criminally indict
the industry, but they were overruled by
top antitrust officials of the Nixon Adminis-
tration who instead entered a civil suit. In
September 1969, the companies concerned
entered into a consent agreement with the
government stipulating that they would not
enter into such a conspiracy again. EPA
estimates that the automotive air pollution
resulting from this conspiracy has cost the
nation $2.7 billion minimally.
In 1971, Ford illegally shipped 200,000
1972 model cars to dealers prior to obtaining
EPA approval of their emission control de-
vices, in clear violation of the Clean Air Act.
The government imposed a $10,000 fine on
Ford, less than $0.25 per car.
In 1972, Ford massively cheated on emis-
sion control certification tests. With Justice
approval, they managed to ward off a subse-
quent criminal prosecution and jail sentence
by paying a $7 million fine.
In 1973, illegal control "defeat devices"
were installed on 1973 vehicles by the major
domestic manufacturers. EPA had to order
removal of these devices from about 2 million
cars manufactured by GM, Ford, Chrysler,
and American Motors.
Illustrative Examples of Distortion and
Manipulation
It is well recognized that the domestic
automobile companies have long and strenu-
ously campaigned against the basis for air
pollution standards which are widely ac-
cepted by the scientific and public health
communities. They have minimized the docu-
mented relationships between air pollution
and adverse health effects. They have sug-
gested that air pollution is harmful at only
very high levels, and in only certain areas.
They have additionally contended that auto-
mobiles are less important contributors to
air pollution than are stationary sources.
Former GM President, Mr. James Roche,
has claimed that federal antipollution regu-
lations have resulted from consumer "harass-
ment". The same theme has been reiterated
by Ford's President, Mr. Lee M. Iacocca,
who has warned that the industry "has been
backed to the cliff edge of desperation" by
these regulations. The industry frequently
bemoans the "rising tide of consumerism"
and its "excessive preoccupation with auto
safety."
The domestic auto manufacturers have
claimed an inability to develop low-polluting
alternatives to the obsolete internal combus-
tion engine (ICE). The success of foreign
competition however, seems to challenge the
motivation of such an inability. An alterna-
tive hypothesis for this motivation is the
large standing investment of the major auto
companies in capital equipment for manufac-
turing the ICE, which would be rendered
largely obsolete by a major change in auto-
motive engine technology.
The major domestic manufacturers were
able to persuade Mr. W. Ruckelshaus, pre-
vious Administrator of EPA, of their ina-
bility to meet the statutory '75/76 standards,
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needed an extra year. On the basis of their
remonstrations, Mr. Ruckelshaus, in the best
of faith, supported the industry position at
congressional hearings, stating:
"If GM is forced to introduce catalytic
converters across the board on '75 models,
the prospect of an unreasonable risk of busi-
ness catastrophe and massive difficulties
with these vehicles in the hands of the
public must be faced. It is conceivable that
complete stoppage of the entire production
would occur, with the obvious tremendous
loss to the company, shareholders, em-
ployees, suppliers, and communities. Short
of that ultimate risk is the distinct possi-
bility of varying degrees of interruption
with sizable dislocation."
However, within two months of this de-
ferral, GM announced that they had managed
to install catalysts around the board for '75
cars, a striking reversal over the course of
two months.
Another similar, but even more blatant ex-
ample ofmanipulation became evident during
the first EPA suspensions hearing in April
1972, when the automobile manufacturers
claimed that installation of emission controls
in 1975 cars would induce a 5-10% fuel
penalty over 1972 cars. However, by April
1973, at the second EPA suspensions deci-
sion, the manufacturers admitted that there
would be no fuel penalty. By June 1973,
GM publicly announced and then informed
Congress that there would be a sales-
weighted fuel economy of 13%o due to con-
verters, another striking reversal.
EPA has testified that, contrary to in-
dustry's allegations, technology is available
to meet the original 1975 standards. The
EPA position has been endorsed by the
1973 NAS-NRC Committee on Motor Vehicle
Emission Report, and by small foreign manu-
facturers who have produced various prac-
tical alternatives to the ICE.
Industry in general, with the notable ex-
ception of GM, has called for the relaxation
of air pollution standards and for discarding
antipollution devices to alleviate the "energy
crisis." However, it is apparent that more
significant major economies can be readily
achieved in a variety of other ways, such as
reduction of vehicle weight and by elimina-
tion of various optional equipment, especially
air conditioning. Elimination of air condi-
tioners, rather than emission controls, would
produce an economy gain of about 59 by
conservative EPA estimates. The automobile
and oil industries, however, continue to
request that emission controls be abandoned.
Illustrative Examples of Monopolistic
Practices
Not only have domestic automobile com-
panies restricted internal R&D into alterna-
tives to the ICE, but they have effectively
discouraged consideration of outside tech-
nology. Illustratively, after Honda announced
that it had converted a Chevrolet Vega to
stratified charge which met standards with
good mileage performance, GM delayed sign-
ing the confidentiality agreement for a fur-
ther eight months before even examining
the Honda technology. Honda has recently
demonstrated that stratified charge technol-
ogy can be equally well applied to large
engines, such as the Chevrolet 350. Accord-
ing to EPA test results, the Honda and the
Toyo Kogyo (Mazda) easily meet the 1975
standards. Mercedes-Benz has also produced
a diesel meeting the 1975 standards.
The public interest movement feels that
the automobile industry has to be persuaded
or forced to sacrifice short-term marketing
interests in favor of long-term societal goals.
There are also feelings that the industry
must be prevented from making unilateral
monopolistic decisions widely affecting the
market place. For instance, the GM Opel
diesel Cadet, now being sold in Germany,
meets 1975 standards for hydrocarbons and
carbon monoxide, almost reaches the 1976
NO. standards, obtains 30 miles/gal and
weighs only 3000 lb. GM has, however, de-
cided not to import this small and efficient
car to the U.S. because of their unilateral
predetermination of what the American con-
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to protect the ICE are not excluded from
such considerations.
The example of the Hinez stratified charge
engine, well known to industry in 1958,
further supports needs for independent re-
search. In the early '60's, Ford stated that
the Hinez model would probably be in pro-
duction by 1965, which it was not and still
is not. In the 1969 conspiracy case, the
Justice Department cited three reasons why
the automobile industry should have devel-
oped the Hinez engine when they were first
approached in '58: fuel economy, low cost,
and low emissions. The Hinez technology has
been recently developed by Honda.
Some Observations on Catalytic Converters
In general, the use of catalytic converter
devices is endorsed by public interest groups
as a practical method for complying with
the immediate requirements of the Clean
Air Act. The public interest movement amply
recognizes the trade-offs involved between
needs to control hydrocarbons, carbon mon-
oxide, and NO, and the risk of adverse
effects of nonregulated emissions from con-
verters: sulfates, platinum and palladium.
There are also concerns as to the possibility
of a "consumer revolt" if such devices prove
ineffective in the hands of the user and also
as to the likelihood that ineffective catalysts
will result in greater emissions than would
have occured from uncontrolled 1969/1970
cars. The critical evaluation of such trade-offs
clearly requires free access to the underlying
data base. This has proved difficult, if not
impossible, as illustrated by the refusal of
industry to release certification data. In
private, the catalyst manufacturers have
stated that they have submitted extensive
and all necessary data to top EPA officials.
If this is the case, such information does not
appear to have yet reached the technological
echelons of EPA, let alone the public sector.
Perhaps as critical as the access to data is
the fact that data on a wide range of prob-
lems relating to converter usage-such as
sulfate, platinum and palladium emissions,
their chronic toxicology, and their atmos-
pheric chemistry-are grossly inadequate or
nonexistent. For these reasons, and also in
order to avoid creating disincentives to the
development of nonpolluting alternate tech-
nologies, it is critical to ensure that the
industry does not make long term commit-
ments to converters. However, the concerned
industries are now talking of commitments
as long as seven to ten years.
The economic advantages of the converter
to the industry and the need to prevent fur-
ther erosion of the Clean Air Act are both
so compelling that it is now certain that the
converter will be marketed for the next few
years in spite of a wide range of serious un-
resolved questions. It thus seems essential
to impose strong limitations on the converter
market in order to limit the commitment and
to ensure further regulatory flexibility.
Some Public Interest Recommendations
Access to Data
The first and most critical need of public
interest groups is for free access to data.
Public interest groups recognize needs for
due safeguards of commercial secrets, pro-
vided that the decision as to whether these
are true commercial secrets, as defined by
the Freedom of Information Act, has been
validated by the Office of General Counsel,
and provided that such determinations have
not been made unilaterally by corporate
management.
Top management in EPA should review
the whole technical information system and
institute necessary corrections and modifica-
tions with view to promoting a free and
unconstrained flow of information. Illustra-
tively, consideration should be given to plac-
ing all concerned public interest groups on
relevant mailing lists, such as the APTIC
reports which all EPA contractors now re-
ceive regularly and gratis.
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Decision-Making Processes
It has now become axiomatic that there
are major defects in decision-making proc-
esses in regulatory practice. It is clear that
the system of checks and balances, essential
to the democratic process, is largely absent
from current regulatory practice. Apart from
limited post hoc resource, the citizen and
consumer, and those who represent his or
her interests, scientifically and legally, are
virtually excluded from anticipatory involve-
ment in decisions vitally affecting them. The
concept of matching benefit against risk has
been generally applied to maximize short-
term benefits to industry, even though this
may entail minimal benefits and maximal
risks to the consumer. Such problems are,
in large measure, attributable to crippling
constraints which still dominate decision-
making processes within regulatory agencies.
Responsibility for these constraints in regu-
latory agencies must be shared by the legis-
lature, the scientific and technical community,
and consumers and citizens, who have not
yet developed adequate mechanisms for pro-
tecting their own vital rights and interests.
Public interest groups are deeply con-
cerned by the fact that they are not ade-
quately, if at all, represented at all phases
of informal and formal discussions between
agencies and industries, besides in all phases
of formal decision-making processes. Addi-
tionally, all Federal Advisory Committees
should have adequate and not nominal rep-
resentation of qualified scientific and legal
representatives of established public interest
groups. Exchanges between agency officials
and public interest representatives should
be encouraged at all possible levels, including
by the temporary recruitment of qualified
public interest representatives to agency staff
positions, under terms of the Interpersonnel
Act.
Hidden pressures on agencies, as exerted
by powerful concentrated economic lobbies,
subvert both development and implementa-
tion of standards and of the total regulatory
process. This has been well recognized in
such statements as:
"It is the daily machine-gun like impact
of both agency and its staff of industry that
makes for industry orientation on the part
of many honest and capable members, as
well as agency staffs." (Report of J. Landis,
to President-elect Kennedy, 1960).
Nevertheless, appropriate reforms in
agency-industry-societal relationships have
yet to be developed. Reforms apart, it is
clear that regulatory decisions must be made
in the open political arena and on the basis
of the evaluation of scientific data that is
both expert and unbiased. Industry must be
encouraged to avoid preoccupation with
short-term economic products and processes
which have not been adequately tested by
competent and independent investigators.
Such approaches will minimize or preclude
the possibility of economic dislocation which
would otherwise ensue when subsequent
challenges necessitate the belated withdrawal
of the product or process from commerce
and the workplace. Such approaches also
reflect recognition of the consonance of long-
term industrial interests and broadly-based
societal goals and values.
An additional specific concern of public
interest groups is the suspicion that industry
has unilateral access to proposed rule making
at the OMB level prior to announcement in
the Federal Register. If these rumors are
valid, this offers industry an opportunity to
get "objectional requirements" eliminated
prior to announcement of proposed rule
making in the Federal Register.
Germany now requires that all corpora-
tions have a federally appointed public di-
rector to represent the public interest. Such
a practice should well be extended to U.S.
industry, in general, and to the automobile
and oil industry, in particular.
Need for Expanded and Independent
Research
There are self-evident needs for a massive
expansion in research on alternate power
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and Sterling-both by EPA and independent
research groups. It seems clear that industry
will not voluntarily develop low emission
engine technology unless there is a substan-
tial and immediate profit incentive, such as
from the use of converters whose cost can
be directly passed off to the consumer, in the
meanwhile claiming that these emission con-
trol devices are federally imposed. Industry
would rather follow this self-serving strategy
than develop more efficient and less polluting
alternatives. There thus seems no option but
to develop independent research on such al-
ternatives, which could be funded by emis-
sion taxes in recognition of externalized
adverse public health effects and material
damage resulting from the deferral of 1975
standards, and also by requiring industry to
fund EPA-contracted R&D. Authority for
the latter requirement is implicit in the Clean
Air Act which requires industry to make all
good faith efforts. Funding EPA research by
industry would clearly represent such a good
faith effort.
A May 1972 GAO report, "Cleaner En-
gines for Cleaner Cars", states categorically
that committed EPA resources are not equal
to current needs, nor do they adequately
reflect the automobile contribution to air
pollution. GAO found that EPA's limited
efforts often duplicated manufacturers' ef-
forts. Recent cuts by OMB have forced EPA
to even further limit research on promising
long-term R&D, such as the Advanced Auto-
motive Power Systems Program (AAPSP).
Needs for Increased EPA Appropriations
EPA appropriations and resources are in-
adequate for the discharge of their mandated
responsibilities in air pollution control, be-
sides for control of other environmental
pollutants. Total EPA appropriations for
air pollution in fiscal year 1974 were ap-
proximately $54 million. This is in interesting
contrast to the $700 million spent in the
same year by industry on emission research,
especially as the results of industry research
are largely unavailable.
The Federal efforts in air pollution re-
search and abatement are incommensurate
with the massive, and hitherto externalized,
costs involved. A CEQ-EPA-Commerce docu-
ment, released in the Spring of 1972, indi-
cated that the cost of air and water pollution
abatement from 20 major manufacturing
industries, during the period of 1972-1980,
was approximately $6 billion annually. How-
ever, the same report stated that the annual
cost to this country from air pollution alone,
in terms of material damage and public
health damage approximated $16 billion.
April 1975 179